

The Integration of U.S. Army AH-64 (Apache) Helicopters  
Into USAF Aerospace Expeditionary Force Organizations:  
Bridging the Conceptual Gap Between Halt Doctrine,  
Strategic Preclusion and JV 2010

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## *Contents*

|   | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| DISCLAIMER .....  | ii          |
| PREFACE .....   | iv          |
| INTRODUCTION.....   | 1           |
| OPERATIONAL CONCEPT.....  | 9           |
| HALT PHASE VERSUS STRATEGIC PRECLUSION: DOCTRINAL BATTLE<br>OR CONSENSUS? ..... | 25          |
| THE ROAD TO JOINT VISION 2010.....  | 30          |
| TRANSCENDING INTERSERVICE BIAS AND PAROCHIALISM.....                            | 37          |
| CONCLUSION .....  | 41          |

## *Preface*

This paper will attempt to define an operational concept. The ideas postulated here are not entirely novel. There are certainly historical and doctrinal antecedents for U.S. Army Attack helicopters operating in concert with USAF fighter platforms. Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) doctrine and tactics are well established and the practical joint employment of these systems has been prevalent since the Vietnam War. As the Division Plans Officer for the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (Air Assault) in 1994, the author personally developed planning documents which synchronized the employment of AH-64 attack helicopters into Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) air packages in support of specific operational plans (OPLANS). This concept will suggest a level of integration that transcends synchronized operations and envisions the formation of a truly joint Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) coalescing planning, training, and deployment functions and employing as a single integrated joint force.

The impetus for this idea was founded in the author's recent experience as a J3 Crisis Plans Officer at United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). During two Persian Gulf crisis periods in as many years, DESERT THUNDER and DESERT FOX, both AEF and AH-64 organizations were deployed to the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) to rapidly project combat power into the region. Although the AH-64s were vital combat multipliers to support potential ground combat operations, they preceded the deployment of other ground forces and were intended to initially be

deployed in deep interdiction operations against staging enemy forces. It is during this period, the initial operations of a Small Scale Contingency (SSC) or what is in effect the "halt phase" of an evolving Major Regional Contingency (MRC) that I envision a more deliberate synergy between attack helicopters and the AEF.

Several questions have further fueled my interest in this concept. Could the AH-64 serve as either a supplement to or a viable substitute for the overburdened A-10 Thunderbolt fleet for some AEF configurations? Would there be deployment efficiencies gained by this arrangement, both in terms of strategic lift requirements and staging requirements in theater? Could this more integrated arrangement facilitate more efficient command and control for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and more rapidly generate combat power at the decisive time and place? In light of the recent Kosovo experience, this issue seems particularly relevant.

The future provides a further catalyst. This paper will examine the rapidly evolving joint and service doctrines and suggest that they are more complimentary than divisive. This integration concept may also enhance the collective evolution of the joint force towards the attainment of the conceptual framework embodied in Joint Vision 2010. Could this integration bridge the closing gap between evolving USAF and U.S. Army doctrine while concurrently providing an azimuth towards the attainment of the enabling concepts and technological development required for Joint Vision 2010?

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*"We intend to get to trouble spots faster than our adversaries can complicate the crisis, encourage de-escalation through our formidable presence, and if deterrence fails, prosecute war with an intensity that wins at least cost to us and our allies and sends clear messages to all who threaten America." General Eric Shinseki, USA Chief of Staff<sup>1</sup>*

*"I am on record saying that I think the days of great armies clashing with great armies in huge land battles is over. If U.S. ground troops are to engage an enemy, it likely will be an enemy that has been demoralized, defeated, and denuded by air forces first. If aerospace power doesn't achieve strategic control by itself, it certainly leverages hugely, the use of other forces." General Michael E. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff<sup>2</sup>*

*"The United States Air Force has always been expeditionary. We are going back to our roots. EAF is a mindset that prepares us to respond rapidly anywhere in the world." General Michael E. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff<sup>3</sup>*

While it is clear from the conceptual statements of the Chiefs of Staff of each service that their fundamental philosophical approaches to deterrence, war and strategic force deployment are not that dissimilar, the rank and file perception often reflects a more disparate view. As I have posited this concept for more synergistic joint integration among some of my colleagues, the immediate and often visceral response it elicits is that I am either suggesting some form of blasphemy or that there is some parochial hidden agenda behind this effort. Nothing could be further from the truth. While I am

unashamed about what I consider to be a healthy loyalty to my service, the Army, I remain an unapologetic proponent of air power. One could not serve as a crisis planner in an actively engaged joint warfighting headquarters, as I did, and not be impressed by the rapid generation of overwhelming combat power that can be attained by the application of America's air power. I may however, be rightly accused of one form of zealotry, for I assiduously believe that jointness is the only way America will efficiently fight and win its future conflicts. I firmly believe that this concept enhances joint warfare and beyond that, possesses considerable potential to exploit future technology as an expedient to transition the joint force into the future. To further dispel the notion of some hidden agenda, this concept can be further defined by what it is not. In light of the recent Kosovo experience, and the perception by some that Operation ALLIED FORCE in some way threatens the Army's future relevance,<sup>4</sup> this concept is not intended to validate or defend either the strategic relevance of the Army or the use of AH-64s for contingency operations. This treatise is emphatically founded on the belief that all future wars and small-scale contingency operations will be joint, and that each of our nation's military forces contribute unique capabilities for which the demand continues to exceed the supply.

While ground forces may not be required for the attainment of limited aims, such as with the potentially seductive example of the coercive use of force demonstrated in Kosovo, any conflict that evolves towards a major theater war, or that ultimately involves the requirement to either control a geographical area on the ground, or destroy an enemy's ground forces will eventually necessitate the use of America's Army. The United States Army will remain relevant as long as there is the need for well-trained



infantry soldiers and supporting arms to close with and destroy an enemy through fire and maneuver, a core competency for which the Army is uniquely suited. These same well-trained infantrymen and the combined arms team that supports them, have proven time and again their ability to perform ancillary missions that span the operational spectrum. Throughout this uncertain post-Cold War period, the Army has repeatedly validated its relevance, as there has been an unquenchable thirst for "boots on the ground," in response to innumerable contingency operations. AH-64 attack helicopters predominantly exist to support Army ground combat, but do this most adroitly by setting the operational conditions prior to the decisive engagement of ground forces. Therefore, every regional crisis contingency and major operational plan calls for the early and rapid deployment of the Army's AH-64 assets<sup>5</sup>.

This notion forms the impetus for the paper. Since the planning documents of the warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs) mandate the early deployment of AH-64s and concurrently, the rapid generation and deployment of AEFs, can the integration of these forces be more closely harmonized? To explore this potential, some assumptions must be introduced up front. First, that expeditionary aerospace force doctrine, that defines tailorable, rapidly deployable contingency air forces, will remain operationally viable for the next 10-12 years. Second, that the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and types of operations required for the United States military to undertake will remain fairly constant throughout the same time period. Numerous "brush fires" or small-scale contingency operations that require the rapid deployment of tailorable, joint contingency forces can be expected. Finally, as the joint force transitions to the future, it must be assumed that the military forces of our nation will continue to be compelled to streamline, to economize,

and to conduct every operation with maximum efficiency.<sup>6</sup> This mandates a joint approach that transcends jointness, as we know it today. Speaking to a roundtable of flag officers at the May 1999 Army Aviation Association of America convention, then United States Atlantic Command Deputy CINC, and now USA Vice Chief of Staff, General Jack Keane, spoke out forcefully against the reluctance of some in the Army to operate more synergistically with the Air Force.

“I mean this business of being myopic about ground operations—guys, we got to get out of it...We just got to get out of that kind of thinking, guys, or we’re not going to get into the joint fight.” General Jack Keane, USA Vice Chief of Staff<sup>7</sup>

While there exist prescient thinkers like General Keane on both sides of the argument, the Army and the Air Force propose two strategic concepts that at face value might appear to conflict. The Air Force promotes the “Halt Phase” concept which contends that rapidly applied air power can serve as the key element to stop a large-scale armored invasion of a friendly nation before the enemy force can seize critical objectives<sup>8</sup>. The Army envisions a concept it calls Strategic Preclusion which requires joint maneuver and interdiction forces capable of moving with such speed and overmatching lethality that a potential enemy realizes he cannot achieve his objectives and ceases further escalation. In the Autumn 1999 edition of *Parameters*, two USAF Officers, Lt Col James Riggins and Lt Col James Snodgrass, conclude that these two concepts are for the most part complimentary, and have a good deal in common<sup>9</sup>. This paper supports that view and carries it a step further by inferring that the inclusion of AH-64s into selected AEF organizations will even more thoroughly enhance the synergy and effectiveness of both strategies.

Ultimately this discussion will lead us to the “what next?” The framework the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has developed for the transformation of our future Armed Forces is Joint Vision 2010. “JV 2010 is the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness joint warfighting.”<sup>10</sup> This concept is further defined in the Chairman’s *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, in which a road map is established for transforming key JV 2010 ideas into joint force capabilities. This road map ultimately leads to implementation with a “future in which our 2010 joint capabilities give us Full Spectrum Dominance—a joint team persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.”<sup>11</sup>

While a clear definition of a future conceptual framework JV 2010, by design, is currently far more descriptive than prescriptive. The paper will suggest that there is potential to exploit this joint AEF concept to pursue some linkages, or pathways, to the future as the joint force transitions to JV 2010. This joint AEF could provide a living, warfighting test bed to “market” emerging technologies and concepts in a realistic joint operational environment. This concept emphasizes the potential to create buy-in, sponsorship, and to build joint/operator consensus with an inherently joint, integrated and mutually supporting force structure. The warfighting CINCs are the ultimate consumers, benefactors, and ideally promise to be the proponents of this organization.

This paper will attempt to describe a viable operational concept to create a joint AEF describing the proposed force structure, deployment considerations, doctrine, tactical employment, command and control, and joint training issues. The Halt Phase and Strategic Preclusion concepts will be further explored as a means to demonstrate that this

fusion could foster some immediate impact by melding the two services' operational concepts. This approach should illuminate some of the questions raised in the Preface. As a transition to exploring the viability of this concept as a segue to JV 2010, the paper will devote some discussion to specifically highlight potential tactical concepts, evolving technologies, and doctrinal ideas that could directly benefit from this concept.

The paper will also focus some attention on sensitive issues that must be resolved to make this concept viable. Ancillary to an innovation of this magnitude are interservice rivalries, service culture biases, institutional lethargy, and resistance to change. Known and existing Army and Air Force disagreements over such issues as Air Tasking Order (ATO) integration, command and control doctrine and structure, and battlespace management will be addressed. This analysis will suggest how this concept could provide a catalyst for overcoming those issues and emphasize that the potential solution could reside in the real-world mission focus and CINC support this joint AEF concept will attempt to engender.

This methodology attempts to portray this integrated joint AEF as a near-term solution for enhancing the warfighting effectiveness of both services and as a long-term method for attaining a level of "jointness" in Army and Air Force operations that is inextricable from the ubiquitous condition of joint integration required for the evolution towards JV 2010. Every tenet of JV 2010--dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics--is showcased, and potentially enhanced by a joint AEF. The paper applies the characteristics of JV 2010 as a means to illustrate how this integration could provide the genesis to further operationalize the concept. Ultimately, long range planning is about the future consequences of present decisions.

Joint warfighters may not always share common visions of either the present or the future, but embarking on a common path may provide the nexus to improve upon the effectiveness of both air and ground components as they collectively face, and prepare for, an uncertain future.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> General Eric K. Shinseki, *The Army Vision: Soldiers On Point for the Nation ... Persuasive in Peace, Invincible in War*. On line. Internet, 21 October 1999. Available from <http://www.army.mil/CSAVision/default.html>

<sup>2</sup> John A. Tirpak, "The Leverage of Airpower," *Air Force Magazine*, May 1999, 34. Mr. Tirpak quotes General Ryan from an interview.

<sup>3</sup> General Michael E. Ryan, speaking as an introduction for a video tape presentation supporting a lecture by Colonel Ed Rice USAF, subject: "Expeditionary Aerospace Force," to the Air War College, 13 November 1999.

<sup>4</sup> John T. Correll, "Lessons Drawn and Quartered," *Air Force Magazine*, December 1999, 2.

Also: Robert Suro and Bradley Graham, "Army Plans Lighter, More Mobile Forces," *Washington Post*, October 8, 1999, 4.

<sup>5</sup> The author served as the G3 Plans Officer in the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (AASLT), XVIIIth Airborne Corps and as a J3, Joint Plans Officer for United States Central Command. In both positions, he personally worked the Time Phased Force Deployment Lists for all regional plans. While the Chief of Doctrine for the United States Army Aviation Center the author had detailed knowledge of the potential contingency deployment requirements for every active component AH-64 battalion.

<sup>6</sup> John A. Tirpak, "Strategic Control," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1999, 27.

<sup>7</sup> Erin Q. Winograd, "Next Vice Chief Argues Aviation Assets Must Be Put Under Joint Control. Keane: Army is 'Myopic' About Ground Ops," *Inside the Army*, May 17, 1999, 6.

<sup>8</sup> Elaine M. Grossman, "Duel of Doctrines," *Air Force Magazine*, December 1998, 30-34. Referenced in this article is Retired USAF Maj Gen Charles D. Link, a strong advocate of the "halt phase" concept. General Link contributed to briefing slides made available from the USAF Doctrine Center, which further aided the author's understanding.

<sup>9</sup> James Riggins and David E. Snodgrass, "Halt Phase Plus Strategic Preclusion: Joint Solution for a Joint Problem," *Parameters*, Autumn 1999, 70-71.

<sup>10</sup> General John M. Shalikashvili, *Joint Vision 2010*, July 1996, 1.

**Notes**

<sup>11</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, May 1997, ii.

## Chapter 2

### Operational Concept

*"I believe we need all the forces that we have in our military...because I think you need the threat of all the forces we have to bring about a solution—a strategic solution...In some cases, you need to bring all the forces to bear. In some cases, in order not to use force, you have to threaten its use." <sup>12</sup> General Michael E. Ryan, USAF Chief of Staff*

In recognition of the post-Cold War era and the demands it has placed on the Nation's military over the past ten years, the Air Force altered its threat based mind-set. The Cold War Air Force focused on containment, a large forward presence and a fight in-place strategy. The 21<sup>st</sup> century USAF is a smaller capabilities based force designed for global engagement with the ability to respond to major regional contingencies such as DESERT STORM, small scale contingencies like DESERT FOX, and military operations other than war as were conducted in Haiti and Bosnia. While remaining forward based, the Air Force is required to respond around the world and to operate from remote bases with minimal infrastructure and support. The expeditionary concept does not alter the Air Force's response to the CINCs' war plans, nor does it change the total forces required for deployment under the time phased force deployment documents that allocate forces for specific plans and contingencies. Instead, it task organizes deploying forces into units tailored to specific missions. These organizations are particularly adaptive to small-scale

contingency scenarios, and in response to the "Flexible Deterrent Options" that provide the foundation and "opening moves" for most major theater war plans.<sup>13</sup>

Aerospace Expeditionary Forces will institutionalize an expeditionary culture for the USAF and are by design rapidly responsive, lighter, leaner and more deployable forces tailored to the needs of theater CINCs. They are designed to integrate the total Air Force, to include reserve components, and are intended to provide more stability and deployment predictability to the Air Force while enhancing availability and responsiveness to the supported CINCs. AEFs do not change the baseline organizational structure of the Air Force and are not a system of tiered readiness. AEFs are comprised of forces that forward-deploy to the contingency theater and also include on-call forces on tethers, or response times, to respond from the continental United States (CONUS). In this manner, GLOBAL POWER operations that employ strike packages that emanate from CONUS to a target area and return to CONUS on a single sortie, can simultaneously be on-call in supporting of an AEF. AEF organizations are designed and tailored by the capabilities required and can include aircraft that perform the full spectrum of USAF missions.<sup>14</sup>

For the USAF to more effectively manage operations and personnel tempo in this volatile and uncertain world, AEF organizations follow a life cycle schedule much like the U.S. Navy does to manage its carrier battle groups and air wings. This life cycle encompasses a period on-call or deployed, a stand down period for leaves and recuperation, a period of normal training and exercises designed to maintain readiness, and a period to "spin-up" and prepare for the next AEF deployment or on-call period. This life cycle is fundamental to the sustainability of the concept over time. A tension



and challenge that remains is in the allocation and management of low density, high demand assets such as intelligence and electronic warfare platforms and combat search and rescue aircraft, common to nearly every contingency requirement, but in very short supply.<sup>15</sup>

U.S. Army units must respond to the same range of contingencies and many U.S. Army organizations to include the Eighteenth Airborne Corps, Special Operations, and even some heavy task forces continuously operate with a rapid deployment or expeditionary mind-set. Some Army units, in fact, deploy on schedules that are nearly concurrent with AEFs and most theater CINC OPLANS and contingency plans are formulated to flow forces into theater to be mutually supporting and complimentary. AH-64s are scheduled to deploy early for most MRC and SSC scenarios particularly those involving an armored or mechanized threat.<sup>16</sup> The AH-64 is the United States Army's most advanced attack helicopter and is armed with an array of firepower that includes a 30mm chain gun and the capability to carry up to 16 Hellfire anti-armor missiles or a combination of rockets and Hellfires.<sup>17</sup> Under high demand for their versatility, precision, and lethality, the AH-64 is a tried and proven day and night tank killer with excellent tactical range, target standoff and loiter time. Its capabilities enhance, complement, and support air to ground platforms, such as the USAF A-10 Thunderbolt, an aircraft that many of the AEF configurations bring to the fight. The A-10 is an equally battle tested and capable air to ground platform that can carry a wide array of ordnance.

While not suggesting that Apaches are viable for every AEF configuration or for every contingency, this concept will examine the viability of integrating Apaches into

selected AEF force packages to conduct specific missions for which they are optimally suited. These include attacking tanks under trees or in partial hull defilade (meaning that only the turret, or a portion of the turret can be acquired and engaged), conducting precision engagements against targets with high collateral damage potential, engaging mobile targets, and performing operations in sub-optimum weather conditions not suitable for all USAF air to ground platforms. When employed symbiotically within AEF strike packages, the AH-64's tactical advantages can be maximized and its vulnerabilities reduced. Under the umbrella of the AEF's organic intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and integrated into a package of deep strike interdiction aircraft, and other air to ground platforms such as the A-10, the AH-64 can ingress to an engagement area in a more benign air defense environment and attack targets selected to capitalize on its unique capabilities.

Air Force and Army Aviation tactics for supporting ground operations reflect numerous similarities. AH-64s are optimized and best support Army ground combat forces by establishing the operational conditions that will either preclude a close fight or severely degrade an adversary's combat power prior to his closure with the friendly ground force. Much like USAF interdiction platforms, Apaches are best employed in an interdiction role, massed against enemy formations or other targets that facilitate enemy maneuver, when they are most vulnerable to attack in space and time. Apaches can perform a close air support role but optimally, Army Aviation planners strive to employ them in ways that mitigate the need for "911 call" close air support missions. An example will further illustrate the complimentary nature of the AEF and the AH-64 and help to set the stage for a discussion of their integration.

Historically, the AEF concept has already proven effective in response to numerous recent contingencies. Operation DESERT FOX, conducted in the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of operations December 1998 is one clear example. For DESERT FOX and for the deployments and contingency plans that preceded it (such as DESERT THUNDER in January 1998), AH-64s were an important aspect of the plan. A CONUS based battalion was alerted and elements of it forward deployed to the theater prior to the execution of contingency operations as a counter to any Iraqi reaction with the potential to threaten Kuwait.<sup>18</sup> The combination of the AEF and other forward deployed USAF interdiction platforms, and the AH-64, provided USCENTCOM with the capability to simultaneously acquire and engage multiple echelons of Iraqi forces with the potential to threaten Kuwait throughout the operational depth of the battlespace. Iraqi forces postured closest to Kuwait could rapidly cross the border. These threat forces, in either march or deployed formations, would be vulnerable to engagement by the Apache, day or night, and under all but the worst weather conditions. Much like during Operation DESERT STORM the Apache, and its 16 Hellfire anti-armor missiles would have proven particularly useful in the target rich environment created by massed enemy forces in desert terrain.

Minimal combat ground forces were initially deployed for either DESERT THUNDER or DESERT FOX. The concept for these operations envisioned the AH-64s to be employed in what was effectively an interdiction role and not for close air support of ground combat operations. Should a ground operation have been necessary, the AH-64s were ultimately to be assimilated into their traditional support of the ground tactical plan, but for the initial phase of the operation, they were allocated to support the CINC's

air operations. While this maximized available resources and was a tactically sound mission for the Apaches, it is notable that they were to be included in the Air Tasking Order (ATO) yet remain under Army command and control.<sup>19</sup> Could it not have been more efficient for the Apaches to have been under JFACC control during this interdiction phase?

There should be no difference, once we get our heads screwed on right, in terms of integrating our capability. We've got this nagging fear that somehow, if we turn over our organization to somebody in another uniform, that that organization is going to suffer as a result of that. And I just fundamentally disagree with that." General Jack Keane, USA Vice Chief of Staff<sup>20</sup>

General Keane's use of the word "integrating" is illuminating. This joint AEF concept is designed to integrate the force, not to merely synchronize it. The difference is fundamental to the discussion and it is important to make the doctrinal distinction. The terms are not analogous and the USAF and the Army reflect these differences in their respective doctrines. The Army recognizes the word "synchronization" which it defines as, "the ability to focus resources and activities in time and space to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point."<sup>21</sup> From the USAF perspective, "integration" is defined as: "different aerospace forces capabilities are blended together and used in combination to create specific effects; integration in Air Force parlance, is about putting different capabilities together for a specific purpose."<sup>22</sup> In recent briefing slides provided to the Air War College, the Air Force Doctrine Center stated that the USAF "challenge is to successfully integrate (not synchronize) the joint components into a cohesive force."<sup>23</sup>

While integration and synchronization have similar meanings and are often used interchangeably, the subtle difference in their meanings is relevant. It is clear that in a

joint environment, component forces could conduct largely independent operations while still being synchronized at the decisive time and place. This creates harmony and synergy at the objective or the target, but may not create the level of integration required for seamless joint operations. This is perhaps best exemplified in the previously cited DESERT FOX example when the Army was intended to maintain control of AH-64s that were assigned interdiction missions supporting the CINC's air operations. True integration requires a more holistic approach towards coalescing the joint force that encompasses training, deployment, staging, command and control and employment. As alluded to earlier, the operations of Army attack helicopters and USAF fighter aircraft have been synchronized for years. This paper is introducing an idea that transcends synchronization and requires a high degree of joint integration. This integration includes joint pre-deployment training, a joint deployment operation, forward basing with shared resources, and is intended to culminate with fully integrated combat operations.

This concept would first require the identification of theater contingency plans that direct the use of AH-64s prior to the planned employment of ground forces. Some of these contingencies are also included in the flexible deterrent options (FDOs) for specific numbered operational plans. For plans in which both an AEF and an Army Apache package of some size are envisioned, integration may prove viable. This would require the two services to conduct joint training, exercises, and liaison prior to deployment. A command and control structure would have to be agreed upon based on the size and composition of the total joint AEF. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) would, under the direction of the respective CINC, have to agree on the appropriate command and control

arrangement, and specifically decide on if or when (should a ground operation ensue) command and control of the Apaches should revert to the JFLCC.

The integration of the deployment and staging of forces offers much potential. An AEF that includes AH-64s may not require as many A-10s, an asset that has routinely been over tasked by recent AEF deployments.<sup>24</sup> There are also potential savings by reducing the duplication of maintenance personnel, communications support, fuel handlers, security forces, and other administrative and logistical support. Any economies realized in basing requirements, support requirements, or logistics benefit the entire joint force. Logistical and other support requirements effectively dictate the pace of sustainable operational tempo. Resources that can be shared by the joint force effectively become force multipliers. A force that has trained together and deploys as a team will inherently develop trust and cohesiveness. The redundancy born of uncertainty over what a joint counterpart will bring along to the fight can be eliminated by this more deliberate integration. Long before the joint AEF deploys, the Apache force will be integrated and the size and composition of the Army component, clearly established. Basing rights are imperative for AEFs and must be continuously re-negotiated. The integration of staging and basing should enhance planning efficiency and ease the burden on host-nation support requirements. While tactical considerations such as mission differences and aircraft ranges will not allow for the use of shared base structures for every contingency, there are many operations such as in South West Asia and the Korean peninsula that will make co-location feasible.

Recognizing the operational requirement for a lighter, more agile, and more strategically deployable combat force, the Army is designing a new combined arms

medium brigade (also referred to as the "objective brigade"). This force is designed to strike a balance between deployability, firepower, force protection and sustainability. While by orders of magnitude more deployable than any current mechanized brigade-sized task force in the Army, the new proposed medium brigade still bears a substantial airlift pricetag.<sup>25</sup> Another rapidly deployable configuration worthy of consideration is an Apache helicopter based "Aviation Heavy Task Force" which includes up to 3 AH-64 battalions (72 helicopters), an infantry battalion sized security force, a company team comprised of utility and medium lift helicopters, an artillery battery, a combat engineer company, an air defense platoon, a command and control element, and adequate logistics support to supply the force (minus fuel) for 10-15 days. This force can be deployed with approximately 45 C-5 equivalents and 70 C-141 equivalents within 96 hours.<sup>26</sup> If a force package of this firepower, mobility, and versatility were integrated into an AEF, the operational and tactical employment possibilities would be innumerable.

In theaters where contingencies exist that already plan for the concurrent deployment of AEFs and Apaches, the employment potential of this force spans the entire spectrum of potential contingency operations. Employed in an integrated fashion with USAF platforms, the Apaches could conduct operations with the mutual support of aircraft that will enhance their efficiency, survivability and lethality. Some examples of this mutual support relationship where the Apache could potentially enhance the AEF include: reconnaissance operations, security operations, attacking mobile mechanized forces, or conducting precision engagements against targets with either high collateral damage potential or that are difficult for fast moving fixed-wing aircraft to efficaciously acquire. One does not have to look very far to find the antithesis of an integrated joint AEF. With

no intent to be pejorative, the recent Kosovo experience may provide an illuminating example.

Substantial changes are needed in the readiness, training, equipment, and organization of the AH-64 and Army Aviation if it is to function effectively as a rapid deployment and expeditionary force. Anthony H. Cordesman<sup>27</sup>

As the cited quote reinforces, in the din of the post-Kosovo clamor, the deploying Army Aviation Task Force has been sharply criticized for its training, personnel and equipment readiness, deployment time, and the size of the overall package and number of C-17 platforms required for its airlift. Recent post-Kosovo after action studies cite many specific problems that appear to further underscore and support these criticisms, and the Army's leadership has acknowledged many of them. While after a more deliberate assessment, it has been established that a number of these cited problems were either misleading, not objectively addressed, or founded on inaccurate or incomplete information, it is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to refute every potential finding. Rather, this analysis will focus on joint issues and shortcomings that in the future might be alleviated by an integrated AEF. While both the Apache helicopter and the deploying Army Aviation task force have absorbed the brunt of the post-operation criticism, it bears mention that at the core of Task Force Hawk was the same Apache helicopter brigade, under the same commander that conducted a flawless Bosnia rotation less than a year prior. By every account, they were an outstanding outfit.<sup>28</sup>

What deployed to Albania in support of Operation ALLIED FORCE was in reality a large Army task force, which exponentially exceeded the support force required to introduce the combat power of the Apaches into the operation. This ancillary force structure deployed to provide command and control, a robust suppression of enemy air



defense capability, logistics support, and force protection. Were the Apaches fully integrated into the JFACC's operations, in the manner proposed by the joint AEF concept—as a component force—and based with other forward deploying assets that supported the JFACC, the size of the initially deploying Army footprint could potentially have been reduced. Collocating the basing of the entire aviation force, as is feasible for some Southwest Asia or Korea scenarios, was not an operational alternative for this operation. It may have been possible however, to at least temporarily stage the “teeth” of the Apache force, and its immediate support, in some proximity to either forward-deployed combat search and rescue or other special mission helicopters, to conduct specific missions. While not eliminating the need for organic Army support in Tirana, Albania, a more integrated approach to basing and logistics may have eliminated some of the Army's robust structure. In fairness, it must also be established that the Apaches were initially ordered to deploy to Macedonia. When that guidance changed late in the planning, the problems inherent to an already difficult deployment were further exacerbated. The force protection challenges created by the threat environment in Albania cannot be overstated.<sup>29</sup>

The air movement of a self-deploying Army aviation task force of some 61 total helicopters and the logistics tail required for their immediate command and control, maintenance, security and support in no way required the 442 C-17 sorties (22,397 short tons) attributed to the deployment and sustainment of Task Force Hawk. The mainstay of this airlift supported a very heavy Army force structure not directly related to or required for, the employment of Task Force Hawk's AH-64 combat power and the performance of its advertised attack helicopter mission.<sup>30</sup> This 6200 soldier Army force included a

command and control structure that was at its pinnacle, commanded by a lieutenant general. Again, to be fair, much of this force structure was deployed based on both the perceived threat and the strong probability of the follow-on peacekeeping mission that ultimately ensued. That said, however, the lasting legacy of Task Force Hawk remains one of a large and unwieldy Army attack helicopter force that was too heavy to deploy and sustain.

This perception is inaccurate and taints the reality of the Apache's deployability and performance, a platform which pound per pound delivers more relative combat power than any weapon in the Army's inventory. Based on force packaging requirements to deploy the aviation assets and critical support for a similar sized Army Aviation force structure for contingencies in other theaters, 18 C5 and 35-40 C-17 equivalents is a more realistic airlift price tag (C5 airlift is required assuming the helicopters are not able to self-deploy).<sup>31</sup> This number could likely be further reduced with a fully evolved joint AEF specifically tailored in advance for this contingency and established with a prearranged command and control and support structure in place.

Once Task Force Hawk was established on the ground, joint command and control issues immediately surfaced. The fact that the Apaches were never employed in combat may be at least partly the result of a perceived lack of joint integration. While risk of losing Apaches to the formidable air defense umbrella was the commonly cited reason for the AH-64's not being used, there was a discernible lack of trust between the USAF and the Army.<sup>32</sup> During the previously cited roundtable at the Army Aviation Association of America's annual convention General Jack Keane, the Army's current Vice Chief of staff, labeled the Army's thinking on the use of Apaches in Kosovo "dead wrong."

According to General Keane, Army air assets particularly the Apache, must join the roster of tools available to the JFACC.

“I can tell you straight up that there is usually resistance to what I’m talking about. It boggles my mind, but we still have senior leaders, people who wear stars—and obviously a bunch below that—that don’t recognize that if you are going to fly Apaches at distance and range, it’s got to be on the air tasking order. You have to understand we’re trying to conduct an air campaign. If you’re going to fly at range and distance into that air campaign, then your participation has got to be integrated. You may at the same time be conducting a ground campaign, but to be integrated in that air campaign, you have got to be on the ATO. And it’s in your own self interest to support it.”<sup>33</sup>

Citing the Army’s communication problems, and recognizing the communications and intelligence structure afforded to the JFACC, General Keane went on to further illustrate his support of integrating AH-64s into JFACC operations.

“They have real-time intelligence, they have all the downlinks plugged into them and they are retasking Air Force (platforms based on the current intelligence picture). Wouldn’t we want that for our own people flying those Apaches? Of course we would...You want AWACS up there also helping them integrate. Otherwise, if you don’t, what you’re forcing the JFACC to do is to clear a path for you, and this is what some of our guys are asking them to do right now in Kosovo. And I’m telling you it’s dead wrong. The sequence of operations as a result of that will not be integrated into the (larger) operation...The JFACC should determine what the Apache targets are as a result of the entire responsibility he has in conducting that air campaign”<sup>34</sup>

The Kosovo example and General Keane’s prescient analysis of it underscore the need for greater Army-Air Force integration. This integration many have precipitated a level of jointness that could have transcended the problems that plagued the Kosovo operation. In the following chapters, this concept will be further illuminated, first analyzing it in terms of emerging Army and USAF strategic doctrine, then in the context of the future JV 2010 construct. Finally, the parochialism, interservice rivalries, and institutional and service biases that threaten to infect this sort of innovation will be

addressed and ways in which these impediments might be effectively pre-empted will be suggested.

#### Notes

<sup>12</sup> Tirpak, 34.

<sup>13</sup> General Michael E. Ryan, briefing slides provided to the Air War College, "Expeditionary Aerospace Force: A Better Use of Aerospace Power in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," January 1999.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. Also, AWC lecture by Colonel Rice (note 3).

<sup>16</sup> Refer to note 5.

<sup>17</sup> *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, (Surrey, U.K.: Information Group Limited), 1999, 587-591.

<sup>18</sup> "Attack Could Signal Increased Military Presence," and "5000 Soldiers May Ultimately be Deployed," *Army Times*, December 28, 1998, 4. Also: On line. Internet, 7 December 1999. Available from <http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/desertfox> and [www.arcent.mil](http://www.arcent.mil) Also: Paul Richter, "Pentagon Braces for the Unpredictable: A Counterstrike," *Los Angeles Times*, December 18, 1998, 16. Also: Richard Parker, "No Knock-out Blow to Iraq, Experts Say," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 21, 1998, 1.

<sup>19</sup> The author was assigned to J3, USCENTCOM during the period that both DESERT THUNDER and DESERT FOX were conducted and was personally involved in the formulation of the plans for both operations.

<sup>20</sup> Winograd, 6. During General Keane's tenure as the Division Commander of the 101<sup>st</sup> Airborne Division (AASLT) the author served as his G3 Plans officer. During that period General Keane proved to be an innovative and "out of the box" commander regarding the employment of attack helicopters. For one of the Division's regional operational plans, he was willing to place the Division's AH-64s in a supporting role for a United States Marine Corps force for a specific phase of the operation. In return, the Marine's were to support a follow-on operation for the 101<sup>st</sup> with fixed-wing Marine close air support. While not full integration, this arrangement constituted an elevated level of joint synchronization. For another plan that involved the formation of the Aviation Heavy Task Force (introduced in the body of the paper) General Keane placed the infantry and support force under the command of the aviation brigade commander. This was doctrinally and culturally a major transition. The author was not surprised when General Keane advocated the position that there were circumstances under which Army Apaches should work under JFACC control.

#### Notes

<sup>21</sup> FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, June 1993), Glossary.

<sup>22</sup> Frederick L. Baker, *Fifty Questions Every Airman Should Know*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: USAF Doctrine Center, October 1999), questions 31-33, pages 47-52.

<sup>23</sup> USAF Doctrine Center. Briefing slides, "Air Force Doctrine '99," 1999.

<sup>24</sup> "Mothballed A-10s headed back to the flight line," *Air Force Times*, May 31, 1999, 23. Article states that initially 60 and ultimately, if resources are available, 84 A-10s will be refit, modernized, and brought back into service. While serving at USCENTCOM, the author was personally familiar with the over burdening of the A-10 force for ongoing repetitive deployment to the CENTCOM AOR.

<sup>25</sup> The author initially referenced estimated C-17 lift sortie numbers from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Briefing slides provided to the USAF War College, TRADOC "Work in Progress," 29 November 1999. This data was presented in terms of the number of C-17 sorties required to lift the new medium brigade to a probable contingency theater within 96 hours. Upon coordination with TRADOC to obtain permission to use data from the slides, the author learned that many different airlift configurations using multiple combinations of lift aircraft are being considered. The author agreed not to depict the exact numbers extracted from the draft, "Work in Progress" briefing. It must be emphasized, however, that regardless of the airlift configuration adopted, the rapid strategic projection of a force of this size and short tonnage will be a major undertaking for both lift and tanker aircraft. This airlift operation will inevitably compete with other critical intertheater lift requirements.

<sup>26</sup> The author assisted in the development of this task force in 1994. To deconflict the information provided with any actual plans, some of the lift estimates provided are approximate. Deployment of fuel was not considered because host nation support for fuel was available in the area in which this force was to deploy. This does not diminish the challenge or criticality of this planning for this resource. Since the AEF concept requires significant fuel supply at the forward base, the joint AEF concept would be dependent on the AEF to provide fuel for the helicopters that deploy with it. In austere environments lacking in infrastructure, or when it is not operationally feasible for helicopters to base with other AEF aircraft, the deployment of additional Army resources may be required to supplement organic AEF refueling assets. The methodology for tailoring this force package is worthy of note. The planners involved were provided a ceiling of airlift resources available (exact numbers of available C5s and C141s) for the plan and required to tailor a 3 AH-64 battalion task force to match the capability of the available lift. During this current period of increasing demand on airlift resources, this approach is an alternative method for planners to consider force packaging.

<sup>27</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo," (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 29, 1999), 178.

#### Notes

<sup>28</sup> The author has discussed the operation with the former Brigade Commander of the 11<sup>th</sup> Aviation Brigade, Colonel Oliver Hunter, who commanded both the Bosnia Task Force and the Apache Brigade Task force deployed under Task Force Hawk. The author also has viewed numerous recently published after-action reports. As the record of the Kosovo operation has been more accurately reflected, no fault has been found with the manner in which the 11<sup>th</sup> operated. In fact, the performance of its units, commanders, and soldiers has been consistently lauded. This paper is not intended to malign this organization in any way. On the contrary, it is hoped that by suggesting a more integrated and joint approach for future operations of this nature, Army Aviation contingency deployments might be accomplished more efficiently.

<sup>29</sup> Priest, Dana. "Army's Apache Helicopter Rendered Impotent," *Washington Post*, December 29, 1999, A1 and A22.

<sup>30</sup> The number of C-17 sorties for the deployment of Task Force Hawk was obtained through Mr. Kelly Green of the TRANSCOM Public Affairs Office. According to the Washington Post article cited above and further detailed in the 19 April and 3 May 1999 issues of *Army Times*, the approximate force structure for Task Force Hawk included 6200 soldiers (including a 340 man headquarters element). Major equipment included: 24 AH-64 helicopters, 37 UH-60 and CH-47 helicopters, 27 MRLS systems, 14 M1A2 Abrams tanks, 42 Bradley Infantry fighting vehicles, 5 twenty ton expando vans and 190 containers of ammunition. The Washington Post article listed the sortie count as 550 and the tonnage at 26,000. The author chose to cite the lower TRANSCOM figures.

<sup>31</sup> This sortie estimate is based on the author's experience with planning similar deployment operations for various U.S. Army Aviation task forces.

<sup>32</sup> Preist, A22. The Washington Post article cites a report written by Army MG Richard Cody in which he states, "There was friction...Individuals in both services neither understand nor appreciate the capabilities of one another." Also: Elaine Grossman, "Army Commander in Albania Resists Joint Control Over Apache Missions," *Inside the Pentagon*, May 20, 1999, 1. This article notes that initially there was reluctance among the leadership of Task Force Hawk to allow the Apaches to be included on the ATO. While ultimately they were included, this article further outlines a pattern of doctrinal and operational disagreement between both the senior commanders on the ground and others back in the Pentagon. This article also cites a memo from an Air Force liaison officer forward deployed with the TF Hawk deep operations cell to a CONUS based USAF general, which suggested an atmosphere of incomplete joint planning and integration between the two services resulting in a failure to maximize available joint resources.

<sup>33</sup> Winograd, 6.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

## Chapter 3

### Halt Phase versus Strategic Preclusion: Doctrinal Battle or Consensus?

*"The new timetables of this New World dictate that to be the relevant force of choice for the nation for emergency response, for deterrence by putting soldiers on the ground or for warfighting, we have to get there faster." Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera<sup>35</sup>*

*The point of the "decisive halt" is to force the enemy beyond their culminating point through the early and sustained overwhelming application of air and space power. As the "decisive halt" phase unfolds, continuing assessments will be ongoing. As the initiative and options of the aggressor decrease over time, U.S. and allied options or "branches and sequels" increase. Air Force Doctrine Document 1<sup>36</sup>*

It is clear from the cited passages, that arriving at the earliest possible time with the maximum attainable combat power is clearly the objective of expeditionary military operations. It is equally clear that with minimal acquiescence by both services, a shared vision of joint expeditionary warfare could emerge. To that end, the introduction, in general terms, provided the basic definitions for both the USAF Halt Doctrine (referred to in different sources as rapid halt, halt phase, or decisive halt, but all generally synonymous) and the Army's emerging Strategic Preclusion concept. This brief analysis will delve more fully into their underlying meanings and attempt to place these ideas into the context of other evolving doctrinal thought. In doing so, the paper will suggest ways

in which the integration of AH-64s into selected AEF organizations may help to bridge the gap between these two ideas and set the stage for more synergistic future operations.

The national security strategy in outlining the considerations for fighting and winning major theater wars mandates that "we must maintain the capability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of enemy objectives in two theaters in close succession."<sup>37</sup> While the AEF concept was not initially designed to fight major theater war scenarios, it is likely that AEFs will be deployed as components of flexible deterrent options or as forces deployed for precursory contingency operations that may precede major theater wars. In the USCENTCOM AOR, for example, past experience would indicate that AEFs would likely form the foundation for the objective major theater war force package. For this reason, the AEF must be considered a key enabler for any viable halt phase concept. Likewise, as has already been discussed, the AH-64 is a vital component of every theater war plan on the books. The Apache is an equally important enabler for an Army that wants to attain the level of rapidly deployable lethal combat power demanded by the strategic preclusion concept. The viability of strategic preclusion is inextricably related to available strategic lift. Any force package envisioned for strategic preclusion, must be deployable by a lift package of a size that can be reasonably expected to be available, and not predicated on the best-case scenario. Maximizing joint strategic airlift by initially deploying the AH-64s with the AEF, and employing them in an integrated manner under the JFACC, during the halt phase of a given contingency operation, the Apaches are immediately contributing to the joint fight and helping to establish the operational conditions for strategic preclusion. Should the Army be called upon to deploy either the new medium brigade or another tailored force,



and a ground operation ensue, the Apaches can revert to Army control and support the ground fight in their traditional role.

Another way to coalesce the concepts of halt phase and strategic preclusion is to introduce an emerging joint concept that further expands the overarching theory. In August 1999, The Joint Interdiction Study introduced a new term they called "Dislocation" defined as:

"The art of rendering enemy strength irrelevant. It is the setting aside of enemy capabilities in order to allow us to employ our strengths against enemy weakness. Instead of having to confront enemy strength, resulting in attrition, we seek to off-set enemy capabilities at the decisive time and place by creating window of unreadiness easily exploited by high velocity, information based, integrated joint forces, dislocating his operations and forces." <sup>38</sup>

The Joint Interdiction Study coalesces seamlessly with the mutually supportive concepts of "Halt Phase" and "Strategic Preclusion." The study concludes that interdiction operational concepts must integrate as many joint capabilities as possible to deny the enemy time and space to adapt and recover, and to make those effects—divert, disrupt, delay, destroy—as permanent as possible. "Interdiction operations of a joint combined arms nature can strike enemy forces when they are in a relative state of unreadiness for combat; the impact is magnified by this unreadiness and the joint forces necessary to achieve these effects, when employed precisely and aggressively, will not need to be as large or ponderous as main battle forces."<sup>39</sup> This construct clearly supports the theoretical mindset of both "halt phase" and "strategic preclusion." It also suggests a flavor of "jointness" that overcomes the inherent single service proprietary bias of the other concepts. The addition of AH-64s to the AEF would provide the JFACC a fuller dimension of capabilities to more thoroughly achieve this enlightened approach to interdiction.

The Army's traditional doctrinal approach to warfighting remains more geographic and terrain oriented. The USAF approach is more functionally and force oriented. Airmen view the application of force more from a functional than geographic standpoint and classify targets by the effect their destruction has on the enemy rather than by where targets are physically located. Traditionally, joint plans, even for contingency operations, are typically written land or maritime-centric with aerospace power added to support.<sup>40</sup> This mindset more fully embodies the definition of synchronization than integration.

Recognizing, however, that all of our recent contingency strike operations, commenced with strikes conducted by joint air and maritime forces, it seems illogical to approach the onset of a contingency operation that involves deployment of expeditionary forces solely from a geographic or terrain orientation. While a decisive outcome, particularly in a contingency that either evolves to, or threatens to evolve to, a major regional conflict, may likely require the employment of a ground force, the breadth and scope of ground force operations will depend on initial control—the conditions set during the halt phase--and the total effects rendered on the enemy. Adding the dimension of the AH-64, particularly in a configuration like the Heavy Aviation Task Force, previously described, provides the AEF added versatility during the halt phase while simultaneously assisting in establishing the battlefield conditions for the application of ground combat forces should they be required. The full integration of joint forces is what produces synergy. With the addition of AH-64s to the AEF the gap between the notions of force and terrain orientation is closed and military practitioners are inexorably drawn towards the realm of interdiction based on the total effects rendered upon an enemy force.

Whether one embraces Halt Phase, Strategic Preclusion, or the new concept of Interdiction/Dislocation, it is clear that contingency operations are becoming expeditionary for every service. They are also joint and will ultimately be conducted by the warfighting CINCs who have both the operational need and the legal empowerment to be force integrators. The more the services can do preemptively through doctrine, organization, and culture to integrate their respective forces, the more prepared they will be to support the CINCs' joint warfight. The concepts described in this chapter are basically synonymous and all demand integrated joint operations, that if optimally executed, will be deterrent in nature and preempt an escalation of hostilities and the expenditure of greater force. Efforts like the joint integrated AEF, support this new level of integration and ideally help pave the way to the future...a future the Chairman describes as JV 2010. How can this Joint AEF help take us there?

#### Notes

<sup>35</sup> Dickey, Connie E. "Caldera Says Change is in the Army's Future," Army News Service, Oct. 12, 1999.

<sup>36</sup> Air Force Doctrine Document 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, (Maxwell AFB, AL: Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center, September 1997), 42.

<sup>37</sup> National Security Strategy of the United States, *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, (The White House, October 1998), 22.

<sup>38</sup> Joint Warfighting Center, Briefing Slides, *Joint Interdiction Study Concepts and Capabilities*, (Fort Monroe, VA: 24 August 1999.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> USAF Doctrine Center. Briefing slides, "Air Force Doctrine '99," 1999.

## Chapter 4

### The Road to Joint Vision 2010

*Joint Vision 2010 is not a destination. It is a journey. Admiral Gehman,  
CINC USJFCOM*<sup>41</sup>

It is not the intent of this paper to attempt to fully explain the somewhat amorphous concept of JV 2010 beyond the definition provided in the introduction. It is assumed that those who read this paper will have at least a basic peripheral knowledge of the Chairman's vision of the future. To further establish the context, however, it is necessary to note that many of the innovations and ideas described in the JV 2010 concept are already taking shape. JV 2010 is a holistic and systemic process. It is not simply a matter of developing a multiplicity of new technologies or creating, or radically altering, force structure. Instead it is about institutionalizing a process of total joint force integration. It requires a new mindset and "thinking out of the box."<sup>42</sup> The four pillars of JV 2010--dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full dimensional protection and focused logistics—are common elements inherent to the core competencies of each individual service. JV 2010 assumes the premise that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Through total integration of the joint (and ultimately even coalition and interagency) forces and capabilities, the collective effects of the four pillars of JV 2010 geometrically exceed what can be generated by a single service or even by a

synchronized joint operation. Information is the critical enabler that modifies every pillar.<sup>43</sup>

Since JV 2010 is a holistic and systemic process, its architects selected a model widely used within the United States Army to illustrate the new ideas, methods, and innovations that will be required to realize JV 2010. The model employs the following functional areas: joint doctrine, agile organizations, joint education and training, enhanced materiel, innovative leadership, and high quality people.<sup>44</sup> With this model as a construct, the concept of integrating AH-64s into an AEF will be applied, and the ways in which this concept could enhance the transition of the force to JV 2010 more thoroughly examined.

Joint Doctrine: In the last chapter, the evolving service and joint expeditionary force employment concepts that included halt phase, strategic preclusion, and dislocation were explored. The similarities of these three concepts clearly outweigh their differences. It is clear that the military has already entered an era when the air component can be the supported force for either a joint contingency operation or during the halt phase of a more protracted campaign. While current joint doctrine is slow to reflect this realization, both Operation DESERT FOX and Operation ALLIED FORCE effectively validated this practice. Moreover, the direction of JV 2010 clearly articulates a level of joint force employment that will mandate functional command and control arrangements when they are appropriate. JV 2010 will drive the emerging joint doctrine which the Chairman refers to as "the engine of change." As that doctrine is collectively developed and transformed into the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will give it life, the marriage of Apaches into the AEF can facilitate the process. The problems of

Air Tasking Order integration, control of joint fires, command and control procedures, to include the linkages to joint systems and the real-time dissemination of intelligence products, and myriad other challenges, will be more effectively addressed through hands-on practice than through intangible theory and conjecture. Doctrine becomes dogma if it either lacks credibility with the operator, or cannot be feasibly applied. The best way to make doctrine relevant is to develop it in the crucible of actual operations where practitioners can develop and nurture it.

Agile Organizations: This is the nexus of the model for this integration concept. The joint AEF enhances what is inherently a very versatile and lethal expeditionary force. Developing the platforms and the degree of information fusion necessary to attack critical mobile targets--their detection, tracking, engagement and assessment--continues to consume valuable time and other resources throughout DOD. Clearly, this is one area for which the fully integrated Joint AEF could provide a valuable test bed, particularly under the umbrella of the newly formed United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), formerly Atlantic Command (ACOM), which has the functional responsibility for joint experimentation and JV 2010 concept evaluation. The joint training, exercises, deployment activities and actual contingencies the Joint AEF will undertake provide a unique opportunity for USJFCOM to evaluate new joint systems and procedures. In September 2000, USJFCOM will conduct a Joint Contingency Force AWE at Fort Polk, Louisiana. This exercise is being conducted in conjunction with the Air Force Expeditionary Force experiment. One of the principal goals is to improve command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C3ISR) effectiveness through digitization, and enhanced interoperability and interdependence.<sup>45</sup>

As this force will include some of the most advanced command and control technologies from each service, this type of exercise is the perfect niche for the joint AEF.

Joint Education and Training: As discussed, this Joint AEF concept will mandate an integrated approach to training that goes beyond the scope of today's joint exercises. Education is another fundamental. The USAF and Army must inculcate their respective officer corps with a new idea of jointness that goes beyond the current definitions. Nothing can move this process along more vigorously than habitual association and practice. In response to General Keane's previously cited rebuke of the Army's "myopic view" of ground operations, USAF exercise planners have already begun to make overtures towards a broader program for training AEFs to work with Apaches.<sup>46</sup> This is not the level of integration that could be achieved through full integration, but it represents a start. Training and education programs that accompany the development of the Joint AEF will foster cohesion, esprit, and trust. As the informational and technology derivatives of JV 2010 are more fully exploited, interactive, virtual, joint training for this integrated AEF can be envisioned. The challenges of bringing units together for training and exercises can be overcome by leveraging new technology. The joint AEF would provide the optimum force to test such emerging innovations as Distributed Mission Training which will employ state of the art simulation to simultaneously train units at different locations around the world using virtual interactive computer networks. As these technologies are fielded, the new Joint AEF can put them to the test in the crucible of actual practice.

Enhanced Materiel: This functional area holds particular promise for this concept. As technologies are developed and fielded at a frantic pace, JFCOM will have to provide

some unifying method to coalesce and maximize the joint synergy of leap ahead innovations. One example is hyperspectral imaging which has the potential to revolutionize automatic target recognition and discrimination. While exhibiting great potential, this new technology is far from mature. A major problem is the tremendous signature library that must be developed for virtually every potential target over a diverse range of characteristics including environmental, atmospheric, and physical conditions. The USAF is working vigorously to mature this technology. Meanwhile, the Army is continually developing and refining the target acquisition system for its new Longbow Apaches. One aspect of this system is millimeter wave radar, which can discriminate targets by vehicle type at weapons standoff ranges. As these two important technologies evolve, the "living test-bed" of the Joint AEF could potentially make them mutually supporting. The combination of Hyperspectral Imaging and Millimeter Wave Radar could potentially make both target recognition systems more effective.<sup>47</sup> With the Joint AEF in place, JFCOM could develop the joint doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, and training programs concurrently with the test fielding of the new equipment. This is the enabling systemic approach that will expedite the realization of JV 2010.

Innovative Leadership: Leadership is effectively the force multiplier for JV 2010. Leaders at all levels must understand the direction that JV 2010 is taking the force and collectively seek the innovative solutions to get there. That is the essence of the Joint AEF. As leaders from both services coalesce at the operational and tactical levels, they will discover solutions to seemingly intractable problems and cement new bonds of trust and teamwork that can foster the degree of true integration mandated by JV 2010.



Information superiority enhances situational awareness and decision making capability for the leaders of our future joint force while concurrently increasing the demands placed upon them. Leaders in this dynamic environment must learn how to manage information and make it relevant. Leaders who participate in the development and shaping of innovative joint force structures like the Joint AEF will have the opportunity to master new information technologies as they are fielded and will learn to rapidly assimilate these systems into enhanced joint warfighting capabilities. Leaders in this fertile joint environment will gain an understanding of full dimensional joint integration and possess the capability to shape and control the future battlespace with a responsive, versatile, and lethal force that is empowered by the most advanced technology of both services.

High Quality People: JV 2010 relies on the retention of a quality force. While senior and middle level leadership are important to the success of a new endeavor like the Joint AEF the value-added that will be achieved by bringing together our younger officers, soldiers and airmen in this truly joint environment cannot be overstated. The biases and rivalries born of single-service orientation and the accompanying lack of trust, can easily be abolished by bringing talented airmen and soldiers together under a common banner for a shared mission. History has shown us that when we have brought forces together in a similar manner, they have generally learned to overcome any impediments and have accomplished their missions admirably. This quality force is essential as they will be the impetus for the practical solutions that will make the Joint AEF concept functional. They will also take good equipment, technology, and procedures and make them better by application, further innovation and by routinely training as they intend to fight. Necessity, after all is the mother of invention.

If JV 2010 is a journey, then the formation of the Joint AEF could at least provide an azimuth in the right direction. The model provides just a few ideas how this new organization can provide a catalyst for the level of innovation and integration required to bring JV 2010 to fruition. This path will not be an easy one however. It is fraught with barriers and obstacles born of inherent institutional biases and collective experience. Next, the paper will address how it is envisioned that these biases might be overcome.

#### Notes

<sup>41</sup> Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Lecture to Class 992S at JPME II, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, April 1999. During lecture to the USAF War College, 1 December, 1999, MG George Close, J-7 Joint Staff, used the same Admiral Gehman quote in his presentation.

<sup>42</sup> MG George Close, Briefing slides for lecture to the USAF War College, 1 December, 1999. Navy Captain John Warnicke, Chief Joint Vision Branch, Joint Staff J-7, confirmed that MG Close gave his permission for material from his briefing to be used.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> *Concept for Future Joint Operations*, (The Joint Staff: Washington, D.C.), 1997, 73.

<sup>45</sup> TRADOC, Briefing Slides.

<sup>46</sup> The author interviewed USAF Colonel Greg Brown, currently an Air War College Student, but formerly assigned to Air Combat Command at Langley AFB, VA. Following Kosovo and concurrent with the cited comments by Army General Keane, Colonel Brown was involved in preliminary planning for exercises that would entail the exercise integration of Apaches and USAF units.

<sup>47</sup> The author attended a briefing at the USAF Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB on 29 September 1999 presented by LTC Joe Heflin. While not specific to the joint AEF concept, ideas presented during that briefing provided the impetus for this section of the paper.

## Chapter 5

### Transcending Interservice Bias and Parochialism

*"Jointness as originally conceived by (recent legislation), means using the right capabilities, under the right circumstances, at the right time. It does not mean 'little league' rules where everyone gets to play. It does mean vanguard forces where units of all four services are inextricably woven together. And it certainly does not mean creating a climate of intolerance where honestly highlighting the relevant strengths of several service options, is, by definition 'unjoints'." Retired USAF General Michael J. Dugan<sup>48</sup>*

The parochialism this concept will engender is predictable, but in the context of joint doctrine and the manner in which the United States organizes, deploys and employs forces for war that potential parochialism appears manageable. The warfighting CINCs are the true integrators. The manner in which the CINCs organize, tailor, and command and control forces in their own theaters is left largely to their discretion. Joint doctrine is sufficiently ambiguous to provide the CINCs the latitude they require to innovate. While this concept, if embraced, would undoubtedly result in some doctrinal revision, nothing in current joint doctrine could be found to render this concept of joint integration non-doctrinal. In fact Joint Pub 3-0, capstone doctrine for joint operations, very clearly supports both the concept of integration and the role and authority of Joint Force Commanders as the integrators.

It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space and special operations forces in isolation. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be

duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant—and even decisive—in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full dimensional operations against the enemy. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations<sup>49</sup>

As the ultimate benefactors of the synergy created by this integrated and joint AEF, the warfighting CINCs have both the authority and the interest to make it work. They would clearly not permit subordinate commanders to abuse the resources of another service. Instead, they would team build, delineate clear missions for their forces, and phase the deployment and employment of the integrated AEF into an operation. For example, in an immature theater, a JFC might employ a joint AEF to conduct contingency operations and include the use of Apaches, under JFACC control to attack appropriate mobile targets. Should the operational situation dictate the transition to a new phase of the contingency such as a ground operation, the CINC will likely construct his war plans to revert the command and control of the Apaches back to the ground forces and their more traditional role.

This new level of Army-Air Force cooperation was recently expressed in an article for *Joint Forces Quarterly* by former Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer and former USAF Chief of Staff, General Ron Fogelman. They advocated the premise that the JFACC should be the supported commander for overall air interdiction, counterair operations, theater airborne reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and strategic attack, when air provides the bulk of the capability. This mindset further supports both the emerging doctrine and the pattern of operations established by both DESERT FOX and ALLIED FORCE.<sup>50</sup>

The CINCs then, are the fundamental advocates for the acceptance of this concept. They write the plans, request the forces and integrate those forces into the fight. The services, however, within their Title 10 mandate to man, train, organize and equip the force remain critical to the acceptance of this concept. The competition for budget dollars has the potential to drive a wedge between the services and derail concepts of this nature before they leave the drawing board. Recognizing this inherent tension, but also the doctrinal similarities between the emerging expeditionary concepts of the different services, retired USAF General Mike Dugan said, "there's consistency without congruence, there's convergence without cooperation...we need to build the basis for some of that."<sup>51</sup>

Ultimately, what may foster a new level of interservice cooperation is the context of the times. Slowly, but inexorably, the services are being drawn into this new level of jointness. The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, and the Service Secretaries are unequivocally behind JV 2010 and are firmly supporting further force integration. With Joint Forces Command assuming an ever-increasing role in developing the JV 2010 enablers that will make the concept a reality, the conditions are established for new initiatives to emerge. Exercises, such as the September 2000, Joint Forces Command, Joint Contingency Force Advanced Warfighting Experiment that will further test and evaluate emerging JV 2010 concepts, doctrine, and technological innovations, provide an excellent opportunity to lay the foundation for the integration of AH-64s into a Joint AEF and test their employment under JFACC control.

It is no longer a quantum leap to consider a philosophical environment within the services where this sort of an "out of the box" concept could become reality. Interwar

periods, while resource constrained, are often fertile times for intellectual stimulation and innovation within the military. With the level of support shown by the military's most senior leadership and the creation, in USJFCOM, of a functional headquarters optimized to coalesce the efforts of the services and the supported CINCs, there is no reason to believe that parochialism could derail this initiative if in its initial implementation it demonstrates the potential to bear fruit. The CINCs are the customers and if the war plans they create and may ultimately implement, call for the employment of both the AEF forces and the AH-64, they will inevitably be drawn into a greater level of integration. The more the services can do to promulgate a healthy union, only serves to make that integration more efficient and more complete. Recognizing, however, that in an era of diminishing resources, competition, rivalries, and institutional inertia will still exist, this section is concluded with a passage that aptly reinforces the role of the CINCs in fostering integration for the warfight.

Amid a welter of change, by 2010 the reorientation propels the services into head-on conflict. As the weapons which could attack operational and tactical land targets proliferate in every service, each component fights to retain battlefield control of its systems in accordance with service doctrine and culture. In the end the Armed Forces do not grasp the nettle. In the end the CINC has to.<sup>52</sup>

The functions that the services are empowered to perform by Title 10 mandate can at least marginally conflict with the concept of jointness. While some might argue that the sometimes antithetical relationship between the services and the CINCs creates a healthy tension that provides a centering influence, the frantic pace of change in today's strategic environment may demand that the CINCs become even more compelling in their demand for efficient force integration.

## Chapter 6

### Conclusion

*"Senior officers on the operational level are central to the drama that translates strategic goals into tactical action. They must not only constantly link the strategic and tactical levels but comprehend the actions of their opponents in a similar context. How they interpret missions and employ their forces dominates operations. This is why an integrative structure of multiservice command and control must exist on the operational level that induces military leaders to interpret information and activity in ways that exploit capabilities across service lines."*  
Colonel Douglas A. Macgregor, USA<sup>53</sup>

This paper has focused on joint integration, a concept that transcends synchronization and becomes vital to the realization of JV 2010. In their roles as warfighters, the geographic CINCs and their subordinate functional commanders are the joint force integrators. Accepting its role as the force of choice to rapidly project lethal and precision combat power anywhere in the world on short notice the USAF has institutionalized its evolution towards becoming an expeditionary Air Force. Rapid Halt and GLOBAL POWER are operational concepts that reflect this expeditionary mindset. The Army faces a similar challenge and is undergoing an institutional renaissance with the ultimate aim of maintaining a force mix capable of responding with adequate heavy forces to conduct higher end contingencies while concurrently developing and fielding a lethal, yet lighter and more deployable, medium brigade. The Army's strategic preclusion concept operationalizes this expeditionary concept. The paper established that

these concepts, when boiled down to their elemental components are complimentary. There exists more consensus than dissent.

As both forces face the current challenges while also looking to the future, the idea of an integrated AEF that maximizes the deployment and combat power generation potential of both forces while concurrently adding to the options of the CINC has been posited as an option to consider. It is well established that both AH-64s and AEFs will be some of the first combat assets to arrive in any theater of conflict. For this integrated joint AEF to be feasible, both forces will have to compromise and work together. The Army must accept the fully doctrinal notion of the JFACC being the supported commander during initial air operations. The Army must also consider the viability of this Apache force as another rapidly deployable alternative to the new medium brigade, not to be the only option, but a complimentary one. Perplexed by "the silence of the Army's Aviation community when new concepts and ideas should have been roiling the doctrinal waters," Retired Army Colonel Robert Killibrew, writing in the January 2000 edition of Army magazine, challenged the Army Aviation branch to step up to the plate and offer some fresh ideas.

Army Aviation, with its increasingly long strategic and operational legs, should be thinking big and fighting for a prominent role in the Army. The Army's leaders have a right to expect this.<sup>54</sup>

While not suggesting that attack helicopters should totally supplant the new medium brigade and be the force of choice for every contingency, the Heavy Aviation Task Force model this paper introduced, is a very lethal force that provides more combat power than the medium brigade with a smaller deployment bill. Advocating a force of this nature, particularly when it is symbiotically orchestrated into a larger joint force—the joint AEF—may be a worthy position for the Army Aviation branch to champion. For its part, the



USAF would have to work closely with the Army on the functional areas of full integration to include training, maintenance, deployment, basing, and employment that will make the concept viable. Purposely, this paper delved more fully into the “why” then the “how.” Fully developing this integrated joint AEF will be a detail intensive challenge for both services. Our analysis suggests however, that the return may well justify the investment.

This journey towards the realization of JV 2010 will not be a serendipitous excursion, but instead a deliberate course established by trial and error, test and retest, and with milestones to pave the way. The joint AEF is potentially one of those milestones, a means to test emerging joint systems and concepts in the crucible of a living real-world test bed, while it evolves towards the future. With USJFCOM getting more fully established in its JV 2010 caretaker role, the integrated joint AEF could be the catalyst for testing and experimentation into new technologies in command and control and information that can be evaluated at the leading edge by the nation’s “first to fight” forces while they perform their operational missions. JV 2010 can only become a reality if the enabling concepts and technologies are developed, tested, and validated. The joint AEF is one means to that end.

The research established that key leaders and operators in both services embrace similar visions of the future and similar orientations to warfighting. The CINCs as the customers inherently will support any effort made by the services to expedite and streamline the efficiency of delivering trained and ready combat forces to their respective theaters. As established at the onset, Apaches and AEFs are currently being planned for deployment to the same theaters at the same time, to conduct missions under the same

planning documents. Can these forces somehow be integrated to make them more capable, versatile and responsive while also building for the future. The answer has to be, "yes." Current doctrine and concepts and our shared visions of the future will demand this level of integration not only for the AEF, but for other joint forces and functional capabilities as well.

#### Notes

<sup>48</sup> Tirpak, 25. General Dugan is paraphrasing remarks he attributes to Retired Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak.

<sup>49</sup> *Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations*, 1 February 1995, III-10.

<sup>50</sup> General Dennis Reimer and General Ronald Fogelman, "Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Spring 1998, 11-13.

<sup>51</sup> Tirpak, 24.

<sup>52</sup> Richard D. Hooker, "Joint Campaigning in 2010," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, 46.

<sup>53</sup> Douglas A. Macgregor, "Command and Control for Joint Strategic Actions," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, 32.

<sup>54</sup> Robert B. Killibrew, "The Army of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century," *Army*, January 2000, 12.